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This paper identifies and analyses tw o  key policy variables determining the 
success or failure of com m unity participation approaches to wildlife use and 
management systems in Africa. In doing so, the analysis toucnes on a range of 
other relevant issues but maintains an empnasis on the core factors of 
incentives ana entitlements. The focus is on the sustainaole use o f wildlife 
resources outside protected areas for African rural development.
After a brief introduction, Section 2 discusses an example of contemporary 
critiques of com m unity  participation approacnes, wnich suggests that wildlife 
conservation and rural development are parallel processes which should not be 
conjoined. Using this example as a template for the analysis which follows, the 
paper argues that such critiques are flawed by the omission of attention to the 
issues of farmer incentives and collective management.
Section 3 commences w ith  a model which includes these variables and argues 
that the "wild life  and sustainable development" issue is centrally one of farmer 
motivation, rights and organization under conditions requiring collective 
management of w ild life  resources in defined commonages.  This model throws 
uo tw o  key policy variables, objective and degrees of power  and responsibility. 
These tw o  variables are then applied, using a two-dimensional matrix, to an 
examination of various approaches to the subject. The paper argues that 
policies ana programmes which have a developmental focus and confer strong 
authority and responsibility status on legally sanctioned communal natural 
resource regimes are most likely to produce "robust, cost effective and efficient, 
non-subsidized systems and institu tions” for the use o f wildlife in sustainaole 
development.
Section 4 provides a ten-year case study of such an approach, showing 
process, accomplishments and constraints. Section 5 takes up a major 
implementationa! issue involved in the model, that of matching ecoiogicai ana 
social topography. The paper ends with a retrospective summary, arguing tnat 
the prevailing paradigm of community approaches as "exchange of access for 
material consideration" needs to be changed to "conferm ent of access to 
stimulate production". It also suggests that for mucn of Sub-Saharan Africa 
this is the only viable approach to the use of wildlife in sustainable rural 
development.
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WILDLIFE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
APPROACHES TO COM M UNITY PARTICIPATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyse key variables determining 
the success or failure of com m unity  participation approaches to wildlife use and 
management systems in Africa. It derives its mandate for this focus from the 
background statement for this Policy Consultation, which suggests that success 
can be measured by "ro b u s t  c o s t  e ffe c tiv e  a n d  e ffic ie n t, n o n -s u b s id iz e d  
s y s te m s  a n d  in s t i tu t io n s ." The issues specified in this background statement 
for attention under the "com m unity  participation" theme are aadressed, but not 
pedantically or exnaustive iy . A presentation of this length does not permit this, 
and these issues nave alreaay received extensive treatment in the precursor 
document for tne consultation, Whose Eden? An Overview of Community 
Approaches to Wildlife Management. (IIED/ODA, 1994)'1
Systems of effic ient wildlife management and conservation do not necessarily, 
and in all cases, require com m unity  participation approaches. Participatory 
community approaches are no panacea for all w ildlife conservation concerns.
All approaches to com m unity  participation in wildlife management are not the 
same. Behind these simple and self-evident assertions lie fundamental 
distinctions which are all too often blurred in the current policy enthusiasm to 
link conservation and development objectives and which, when neglected, tend 
to result in overly-aggregatea, misleading analyses. A fter outlining one example 
of this kind of scholarship, this paper identifies tw o  critical policy variables 
which must be considerea ana tests their relevance against the record of a ten 
year case study. The paper also discusses the impiementationai issue of 
matching ecological and social topography, and concludes w itn  summary 
comment.
2. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 
APPROACHES
The notion of incorporating the resources of com m unity partic ipation into the 
management and conservation of African wildlife, particularly in connection w ith  
state protected areas, is not new. Nor is the notion that this participation 
should contribute to the development of the communities involved. One has
Other substantial reviews include Western and Wright (1994), Wells. Branaon and 
Hannah (1992) and Rihoy (1995).
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*to examine the histories of the establishment of Maasai-Mara. Amboseii 
fd the N gorongoro  Conservation Area to realize that these notions have in 
Pirincipie, if not in practice, a long pedigree. It was. however, oniy in the 
1980's that a combination of a new "bo ttom -up" philosopny of rural 
developm ent and  a growing constituency of concerns for African wildlife 
conservation provided the basis for major aid allocations by aonors to 
community participation approaches and gave them the status of auasi- 
orthodoxy in the strategies of major international conservation agencies. These 
approaches have spawned a number of designations in the aeveiopment ana 
conservation literature, their abbreviations taking on a typoiogical life of their 
Dwn. Thus we now  have CBC (Community-based conservation; Western and
Might, 1994: 1), CBNRM (Community-based natural resource management;
^ihoy, 1995: 1), ICDPs (Integrated conservation and deveiopment projects;
Veils, Brandon and Hannah, 1992) and many others.
low , in the second half of the 1 9 90 ’s, a growing skepticism of such 
ibproaches is developing. Such skepticism is healtny if it is souna, particularly 
f it helps to separate the wneat from  the cnaff in such amoiguous concents as 
com m unity participation",
present here an outline of this skepticism in tw o  versions. The first is a "so ft"
e r s i o n ,  p r o v i d e d  t o  m e  b y  a a o n o r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a t  a r e c e n t  c o c k t a i l  p a r t y .
'We are supportive o f  community-based approaches to wildlife management, " 
e said, "but we have concerns and reservations. " In the conversation which 
cllowed the concer— s expressed were that community participation approaches 
/ere: a) expensive, b) required long time frames, c) showed mixed or 
t c o n c i u s i v e  r e s u l t s ,  a n d  d) i n v o l v e d  r i s k .  "What i f  communities mess up 
n a n a g e m e n t  a n d  d e p le t e  t h e i r  w i ld l i fe  r e s o u r c e s ?  ” h e  a s k e d .
'he second version is a much more vigorous, aggressive ana acaoemic attack 
m attempts to link rural development and wildlife conservation, i refer to the 
ecent journal article by Barrett and Arcase in World DeveiObment. "Are 
ntegratea-Conservation Development Projects (ICDPs) SustamaDie? On tne 
Conservation o f Large Mammais in Sub-Saharan A frica." (Barrett and Arcase,
1995). While the burden of Barrett and Arcase's critique is on initiatives to link 
ural development and species conservation the article is aiso effectively  an 
attack on com m unity  basea approaches since their data are orawn almost 
exclusively from programmes or projects which claim to incorporate a 
community participation component.
rhe Barrett and Arcase article raises important issues which snoula be 
considered by policies seeking to link conservation and rurai development, and 
Dften are not. It also contains, however, factual inaccuracies and misleading 
assumptions, and is permeated by the patronizing arrogance w hich  professionals 
50 often exhibit regarding the motivations and levels of comoetence w hich  rural 
:armers invest in the management of their natural resource systems.
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Most critically, however, the article fails to draw analytic distinctions which are 
fundamental for an understanaing of the nexus between conservation and 
development. A detailed critique of the article is not possible in the scope of 
this p a pe r,  but I summarize below aspects of the article which will be used as 
a template for the analysis which follows:
a) Barrett and Arcase commence by aggregating initiatives to link 
conservation and development under the rubric "ICDPs".
b) For the authors, the "d is tin c tive  feature  o f  IC D P 's  as c o n s e rva tio n  
s tra te g ie s  is  th a t ru ra l re s id e n ts  are in d u c e d  to s u rre n d e r a c ce ss  to , o r  
c u rta il ille g a l o fftak e  o f, n a tive  sp e c ie s  a n d  th e ir h a b ita ts  in e xc h a n g e  fo r  
a lte rn a tive  s o u rc e s  o f  incom e a n d  s u s te n a n c e "  or other compensation, 
services and infrastructure associated w ith  "an im p ro v e d  s ta n d a rd  o f  
liv in g . " Central to ICDP's, say the authors, is "the b a s ic  n o tio n  o f  an 
e xc h a n g e  o f  a c c e ss  fo r m ateria l c o n s id e ra t io n ." [p. 1074).
c) A lthough this is not clearly specified, the article assumes passim that 
wildlife oroauction comes primarily from "protected areas" which are 
controlled by the state and managed by state functionaries. This is part 
of the aeal : "rura l re s id e n ts "  surrenaer access rights to wildlife and its 
habitats in exchange for other promised benefits. The implication is that 
"protected areas" are ipso facto under state control.
d) Barrett and Arcase are concerned tha t African wildlife resources are not 
capable of sustainably producing the promised benefits in this exchange. 
Among the promised benefits discussed is game meat from cropping 
harvests. For the benefit to be significant m otivationally it must be 
constant, suggest the authors. But, for it to be sustainable, it must be 
variable since wildlife populations are unstable and subject to variations 
due to drought, disease or natural disaster. State (or project) "m a n a g e rs"  
must therefore "be able to re s p o n d  to c h a n g e s  in ra in fa ll b y  in cre a s in g  
h a rv e s ts  fo llo w in g  'g o o d  y e a rs ' a n d  d e cre a s in g  them  fo llo w in g  ’bad  
ye a rs '. " However, reductions in cropping fo llow ing this formula are 
"like ly  to be  p o lit ic a lly  u n p a la ta b le  in the IC D P  c o n te x t . " If political 
pressure limits a manager's ability to reduce harvests, "a d o w n w a rd  sp ira l 
in the s ize  o f  the h a rv e s te d  p o p u la tio n  w ill re su lt, b e c a u se  sh o rt -te rm  
o v e r -e x p lo ita t io n  w ill le ad  to lo w e r  fu tu re  su s ta in a b le  h a rv e s ts , less lo c a l 
c o o p e ra tio n , a n d  so o n . " (p. 1075).
e) The provision of game meat by ICDPs has another danger in the authors 
opinion, in tha t " if  IC D P s  in cre ase  a ru ra l p o p u la t io n 's  d e p e n d e n ce  on 
g am e  m eat, these  p ro je c ts  m a y  fu e l lo c a l d e m a n d  fo r  gam e and , in the  
e v e n t le g a l h a rv e s t  d is tr ib u tio n s  are c u rta ile d  fo r b io lo g ic a l re a so n s  fsee 2
2 In preparation by R.B. Martin and M.W. Murphree.
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/a b o ve ), th e y  m a y  u ltim a te ly  fo s te r the a c tiv it ie s  th e y  are d e s ig n e d  to 
co u n te r. " (p. 1078).
Other modes of promised benefit from ICDPs discussed are cash benefits, 
through sales of game meat, wage employment or the sharing of 
ecotourism revenues. However, the authors point out the variability of 
the mar«ets involved and the fact that revenues often are not returned to 
"co m p e n sa te  lo c a ls  fo r  su rre n d e rin g  a c c e ss  to w ild life  a n d  h a b ita ts ."
More fundamentally, they argue that "fo r ca sh  in d u c e m e n ts  to w o rk  ru ra i 
in h a b ita n ts  m u s t be  able  to c o n v e rt  cash  in co m e  in to  foo d . " This inserts 
them into the risks o f a market economy where "tra d in g  a c c e s s  to 
sp e c ie s  fo r  m o n e ta ry  c o m p e n sa tio n  w ill e xp o s e  ru ra i re s id e n ts  to n e w  
risks a s s o c ia te d  w ith  e xc h a n g e  en titlem en ts , in th a t s e ttin g , p ric e  
va ria b ility  a n d  q u a n tity -ra t io n in g  in ru ra l fo o d  m a rk e ts  c o n s p ire  to 
th reaten  h o u s e h o ld  fo o d  s e c u rity . " (p. 1078).
The authors are also concerned about the possible impact of temporariiy 
successful ICDPs. " im p ro v in g  lo c a l s ta n d a rd s  o f  liv in g  w ill p ro b a b ly  
co n trib u te  to h ig h e r  ra te s  o f  lo c a l p o p u la tio n  g ro w th  than w o u ld  be  
o b s e rve d  in the a b se n c e  o f  an iC D P  tha t is s u c c e s s fu l in e n h a n c in g  the  
w e ll-b e in g  o f  lo c a l p o p u la tio n s . Th is  m a y  o c c u r  e sp e c ia lly  ra p id ly  in 
reg ions w h e re  liv in g  s ta n d a rd s  are de p re sse d , a n d  th u s  im m igra tion  in to  
areas w ith  e n h a n ce m e n ts  is  m ade m ore  a ttra c tive . " (p. 1078).
ICDPs, it is suggested, "e xe rt s u b s ta n tia l in flu e n c e  o v e r  the re tu rn s  o f  
a lte rn a tive  u se s  o f  ru ra l in h a b ita n ts ' t im e ." They suggest that the 
opportunity costs of time for many rural Africans is low, and that 
"sea son a lly , i f  n o t  p e rm a n e n tly , a n y  in c o m e -m a x im iz in g  ru ra l re s id e n t  
w o u ld  be  w ise  to s e t o f f  fo r  the n e a re s t p ro te c te d  area, e ve n  in the face  
o f  risks o f  im p riso n m e n t o r in ju ry . " (p. 1079). This links to their concern 
about the inadequacy of law enforcement capacities among "parks s ta ff. " 
(p. 1081).
The authors are also concerned that ICDPs ao not adequately address the 
cultural use of wildlife (pp. 1077-79) and about inadequately supportive 
national policies (p. 1090).
Having advanced these and other arguments the authors conclude that 
"IC D P s  m u s t be  re g a rd e d  as no  m ore  than s h o rt -te rm  p a llia tive  in a lo n g e r  
term  s tru g g le  to re fo c u s  a tte n tio n  a n d  re s o u rc e s  on p a ra lle l p ro c e s s e s  o f  
ru ra l d e ve lo p m e n t, p o v e r ty  a llev ia tion  a n d  w ild life  c o n s e rv a tio n . " (p. 
1091). They suggest that it is "b io lo g ic a lly  u n s o u n d  to ba se  hum an  
n ee ds, w h ic h  m u s t be  a s su m e d  to g ro w , on the h a rv e s t  o f  w ild life  
p o p u la tio n s  th a t w ill n o t  g ro w . " (p. 1091). Their prescription is for 
development projects to "d e cou p le  hum an n e e d s  from  the h a rv e s t  o f  
large m a m m a ls ."  (p. 1077, also cf. pp. 1080, 1081).
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One couid examine these oomts serially, pointing out inter 5 a that the formula 
for aetermining cropping taxe-offs is managerially naive', commenting on the 
condescension implied in tne warnings about giving rural DeoDies a taste for 
meat or encouraging them to enter markets where they wiii be diddled, ana 
noting the extraorainary omission of any discussion on the value-aadeo 
dimensions of certain mooes of wiidiife productiv ity, sucn as safari hunting. To 
do so would, however, be to miss the main contextualizing issues. The 
fundamental conceptual fram ework from which the article sormgs is that 
conservation-development approacnes are essentially conservation projects 
wnich " induce" significant neighbors of protected areas to cooperate in the 
conservation objectives of these areas. These neighbors are anaiyzea as a non­
ownership reactive category, an undifferentiated blob variously referred to as 
"rurai re s id e n ts , " " lo c a lp e o p le s " , "hum an p o p u la t io n s ," or simply as "loca ls. "
It is from this conceptual model that most of the analytic strengths and 
weaknesses of the Barrett and Arcase critigue arise. To tne extent that 
conservation/deveiopment Dolicies are w hat Barrett and Arcase say they are, 
their critique has significant validity.
3. THE TWO KEY POLICY VARIABLES
_et us now, however, consider an alternative model of the conservation/ 
jeveiopment nexus, wnicn I wiil describe in its polar contrasting form. Let us 
assume, firstly, that core national biodiversity and species conservation 
:oncerns are under state control in systems and at levels w nich  the state can 
ifford to effectively manage. Thus the first characteristic 0  ^ the model is that 
he "w ild life  a n d  susta inao/e  d e v e lo p m e n t"  issue is not primarily about 
larks/peoole relationships, although it may haye implications for these 
eiationships. [See  under 3 .4  below).
Secondly, let us transform our ambiguous categories of "rural re s id e n ts "  and 
'local p e o p le s "  into small-scale farmers who, under prevailing tenure conditions 
1 Sub-Saharan Africa, have individual usufruct rights to their staple lano but 
mo have group claims to the natural resources of a defined collective 
ommonage. Whatever the legal status of these claims may oe these farmers, 
y virtue of their location and their distance from the instruments of state 
oercion, are the de facto managers of wildlife in their respective commonages, 
md, like farmers everywnere, they will manage the wildlife resource through
- Martin comments: 'The authors have obviously not manageo wiidiife unaer 
hanas-on” conditions. It is not ideal to increase harvests following good years and 
ecrease them following baa years. A bad year can be diagnosed at the end of the 
3iny season - well before animals start to die of poverty. The icgicai management 
ction in a bad year is to remove a large proportion of the population leaving a small 
ucleus that wiil survive the drought without undue degradation cf the environment. In 
good year the manager has several options: he couid keep the osculation icw in 
inticipation of further drougnts or he might allow it to buiid up hcoing that tne rains 
vill be favouraDle for several years.' (Martin, personal communication)
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^calculations which consider the opportun ity  costs and benefits of land, labour 
and resource allocations, and tne future benefits of the investment costs wnich 
are integral to sustainable use. The second characteristic of the model is thus 
that the "w ild life  a n d  su sta in a o le  d e v e lo p m e n t"  issue is about farmer 
motivation, rights and organization under conditions requiring collective 
management of w iid life resources in defined commonages.
Thirdly, let us posit w ildlife outside state protected areas as part of a bundle of 
"o ff- fa rm " resources capable of contributing, under the right conditions, to the 
economic well-being o f farmers, reversing the causal direction implicit in many 
conservation/deveiopment approaches. The third characteristic of the model is 
thus that the "w ild life  a n d  su sta in a b le  d e v e lo p m e n t"  issue is primarily about 
development, rather than conservation. It has a conservation component, but 
this is focussed on the sustainability of use, and regarded as a means rather 
than an end.
This model provides us w ith  a significantly d ifferent conceptual frame for the 
analysis o f wildlife conservation/deveiopment initiatives than the fram ework and 
assumptions either implicit or overt in much of the literature on tne suDject.
Two key predictive policy variables emerge by whicn we can anticipate tne 
efficacy and effic iency of systems attempting to link wiidlife conservation and 
sustainable development. These are: a) objective, and b) degrees of power and 
responsibility.
3.1 O bje c t ive
The term "objective" is a loose one which can be given different definitions. It 
has a number o f synonyms in general usage, and we tend to use the terms 
"goal," "purpose," "a im " and "objective" interchangeably. In the world of 
organizational management and project planning these are sometimes ranked 
hierarchically in formulas of log-frame analysis. But I will be simplistic and use 
the word "objective" here to denote the core motivational direction oehinc 
policy, planning and action. This core motivational cirection is itself usually 
determined by a number of subjective preferences and instrumental 
considerations.
As ambiguous and complex as it may be, the objective variable is critical for 
systems attempting to link conservation and development. This arises from the 
fact that such attempts almost invariably link together significant social actors 
whose objectives are essentially d ifferent. The institutionalization of 
conservation as a discrete set of concerns and actions is a product of 
governments, interest groups and scholarship. This provenance tilts wiidlife 
management objectives tow ards species and habitat protection, government 
control and abstract policy. The rural farmers mentioned earlier rarely articulate 
conservation as a discrete set of concerns. Conservation for them is an 
investment factor in the sustainable use of their resources, the objective being 
the maintenance or improvement of their livelihoods or, put more loosely, 
"development".
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When tnese tw o  oDjectives intersect w itn in the farmers' domain there is 
dissonance, w hich  is iikeiy to result in enduring confiic t since both objectives 
and their constituencies have strengths to support their respective goais. The 
resuit is tnat neither objective is achievea. There is no wildlife conservation ana 
there is no development.
The moael put forward above suggests that as a strategic approach to resolve 
this impasse, the aevelopment objectives of farmers should be made 
paramount. In doing so, the conservation objective may, under the right 
circumstances, also be furthered. The success of programmes linking 
conservation and development objectives is likely to be consonant w ith  the 
degree to w hich  they place emphasis on development.
3.2 Authority and Responsibility
The iocation o f authority  and responsibility is the other critical variable by which 
we can predict the effic iency of a system attempting to link wildlife use and 
sustamaole aevelopment. For the purposes of this paper "authority  ana 
respons:oility" is used as a phrase to cover rights of secure, long-term access to 
and ana resources, their benefits, ana the duties associated w ith  these rights.
A number of related terms dissect these rights, inciuaing "ow nership ,"  
"property," "proprietorship" and "tenure".
These concepts have a number of dimensions w hich  cannot be discussed in 
detail here. For our topic the most important points to note are that:
a) These rights, or authority, have a number of derivations. They can 
be conferred by the state, by tradition or in-place institutional 
dynamics. Their strengths wiil be determined by particular 
combinations of legal, political and socio-economic factors.
b) These rights, or "ow nership ," are rareiv, if ever, absolute. Their 
strengths are determined by tneir time frames and the 
conditionalities attached to them. The longer their sanctioned 
duration, their "tenure," the stronger they will be. The fewer the 
conaitionalities attached to them, the stronger they wiil be. As 
Alchian says, the strength of ownership "can be d e fin e d  b y  the  
e x te n t  to w h ic h  the o w n e r 's  de c is ion  to u se  the re s o u rc e  a c tu a lly  
d e te rm in e s  its  u s e ."  (Alchian, 1987: 1031).
c) Au thority  over land and natural resources can be sub-divided into 
d ifferent authority regimes presiding over land and specific natural 
resources. In much of Sub-Saharan Africa, this is typically the 
case through the vertical compartmentalization of government 
administration into land, agriculture, forestry, fish and wildlife 
agencies (Child, 1995 a; Murpnree, 1995 a).
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d) Authority  and responsibility are conceotually linked. When they are 
de-linked and assigned to aifferent institutional actors both are 
eroded. Authority  w ithou t responsibility becomes meaningless or 
obstructive; responsibility w ithou t authority iacks the necessary 
instrumental and motivational components for its efficient exercise.
At a first-order level of distinction, most contemporary societies divide this 
bundle of authority and responsibility over land ana natural resources into state 
and non-state regimes. And, for instance, in most societies o f Western Europe 
and North America these non-state authority and responsibility regimes are 
largely (but not exclusively) private regimes legitimated by titles or leases 
granted to a body corporate, whether this be a single individual or a corporate 
group of persons. This dichotom y does not, or course, eliminate conflict 
between state ana non-state authorities, but it does have the advantage of 
making the linkage between authority and responsibility tighter and giving 
relatively sharp definition to the institutional actors involved.
In most of Sub-Saharan Africa this form of private non-state regime does not 
exist. Farmers iive on lana and use resources wnicn the state legally claims as 
its own. Demographic, ecological and cultural factors militate against their 
attainment as individuals of body corporate status'1 and fe w  opportunities exist 
for them to collectively attain this status. Their autnority and responsibilities 
regarding land ana natural resources are ambiguous and weakly linked, and their 
lack of strong tenure is a disincentive to conservation investments. They are 
thus locked into the amorphous categories of "rural residents," "local peoples" 
and "human populations" of the Barrett and Arcase text, or the "com m unities" 
of my topic. Such conditions are a recipe for the failure o f initiatives to link 
wildlife conservation and rural development concerns.
A change in these conditions must, therefore, be a fundamental dimension of 
any policy wnicn aims to sustainably use wiidlife for rural development in 
Africa. This change, for the demographic, ecological and cultural factors 
mentioned, cannot in most contexts be a aivision ana alienation of existing ana 
largely traditionally legitimated commonages to individuals. It can, however, be 
a de jure alienation of these commonages of land and resources by the state to 
groups of farmers w ho, through politico-cultural ana socio-economic 
legitimations collectively act as their current de facto users and managers.
This, in effect, would be to enable farmers to form state-legitimated strong 
communal regimes for their common pool resources. The impact wouid be, in 
terms of our topic, to transform "com m unity  partic ioation" into communal 
property regimes w ith  authority and responsibility for the sustainable use of 4
4 Kenya is one country with a declared policy of individualizing land entitlement, 
with a mixed record of results. For a discussion of the constraints involved in such a 
policy, see Murphree and Cumming, 1993.
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wildlife, and its hatitat, as a means to their development oDjectives. A number 
of formulas, essentially similar, have been producea to profile w nat such 
communal property regimes require. Among these are Berkes (1989: 10), 
Murphree (1983: 6-7) ana Ostrom (1990: 90). Whose Eden?, p. 49, provides 
an adaptation o f Ostrom 's "design principles" and this paper does not go into 
details. For the analysis here it is suffic ient to note that it is essential for such 
regimes to have:
ai Strong ownership rights, i.e. "the r ig h ts  o f  p o s s e s s io n , u se  a n d  d is p o sa l 
o f  w o r t h . " (Harper, 1974:15). This links cost and benefit, authority and 
responsibility.
b) Strong tenure rights, i.e. the long-term security of ownership which 
motivates the investments in the future essential for sustainable use.
c) Effective institutional structures for internal management and control, 
membership determinations and relationships w itn  external agencies and 
neighbors.
The leap from "com m unity  partic ipation” to strong communal property regimes 
is not an easy one. Powerful interests conspire to block it. For some 
politicians, bureaucrats and their private sector allies it is seen as a loss of 
power and privilege In a zero-sum game between centre and periphery. For 
some conservationists it is seen as a surrender of wiidlife technology to the 
vagaries of cost/benefit decisions by unsophisticated peasants. But, if this 
analysis is right, it is the oniy approach which can effectively  insert wiidlife 
resources sustainably into African rural development. The aegree to which 
policies accept this thus becomes a critical predictive variable in the success or 
failure of systems which seek to link the tw o.
3.3 Classifying and Evaluating Approaches
Having identified and discussed these tw o  policy variables we are now  in a 
position to classify specific policies, programmes ana projects ana measure 
them for predictive purposes. This analysis does so aiagrammatically, 
representing the tw o  variables as axes on a two-dimensional grapn.
(Figure 1.1)
The first thing to note is that the tw o  axes each represent a spectrum of 
possible locations in respect to  the variable concerned. Secondly, we should 
note that extreme polar positions on either axis are unlikely. The variables we 
are examining rarely, if ever, appear in this manner. Thus no specific instance is 
likely to be located at the extreme corners of our diagram. The closest one 
might get to the latter situation might be in a strict nature reserve (Category I in 
the IUCN classification of protected areas, reproduced in Whose Eden?, p . 1 0) 
managed by a well run and weil endowed state conservation agency, free from
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any external threat. But, even nere, the IUCN descriptive text indicates some 
developmental characteristics, so this instance would have to be sniftea to the 
right of the bottom  left hand corner. Most state protected areas are less secure 
in their authority  status and management capacities than the profile I have 
described, and are likely to be scattered along this axis across its range. 
Depending on their national developmental components and impact, they will 
aiso find different locations on the horizontal axis as weil.
(Figure 1.2)
But, for the present, we are not discussing state protected areas but non-state 
regimes of w ild life management, wnether legally sanctioned or not. Those w ith  
strong authority and responsibility will have legal status and means. These 
private, individual (single person or corporate) enterprises may be biasea 
towards conservation or development objectives, and wiil be located across a 
spectrum in the bottom half of our diagram.
(Figure 1.3)
It is, however, w ith  communal management approaches that this paper is 
primarily concerned. These, as this text argues, are unlikely to nave high 
authority and responsibility status. They are thus unlikely to appear in the 
bottom half of our diagram, Most will cluster in the upper left quadrant since 
most have been driven by external conservation objectives. There are 
exceptions. A t the conservation end of the horizontal axis the sacred groves of 
tradition5, while w ith ou t legal sanction, may have powerfu l cultural resources 
providing de facto authority and responsibility, placing them in the iower left- 
hand quadrant. Some "utilizationist" approaches in the "co-management" mode 
can be placed in the upper right hand quadrant. And in design ana principle a 
•ew examples purport to confer legal status to communal regimes of wiid life 
management and use, and thus can be placed in the iower rignt nand quaarant. 
However, using the examples provided by Whose Eden?, the tenqency is for 
most approaches to locate in the upper left hand quadrant.
(Figure 1.4)
The above reference to design and principle draws us to a distinction wnich 
must be factored in our use o f the diagram. This is the difference between 
design and result. The CAMPFIRE Programme, for instance, in principle seeks 
to locate wildlife management in state sanctioned communal regimes. Current 
Zimbabwean legislation, however, places this management under rural d istr ict 
councils, and the Programme depends on these councils to  devolve their
5 cf. Whose Eden, p. 95.
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authority and responsibility to communal regimes. In practice, however, 
rounciis nave responded in various ways, leading to a spread of de facto 
placement of communal regimes along our vertical axis.
(Figure 1.51
"nis discrepancy between policy and practice snouid alert us, inter alia ana 
analytically, to tw o  points. Firstly, our analysis, particularly of large projects 
ana programmes, needs to be fine-grained ana aisaggregative. Secondly, such 
programmes are dynamic. Syncnronic analysis is not adequate; longitudinal 
esearch metnodologies are required to detect Direction ana understand process.
(Figure 1.6)
"he final variant o f our diagram takes up the prescriptive iesson to be drawn 
rom its predecessors. Most conservation ana Development programmes ana 
projects, in tneir profile of objective and degree of com m unity  authority ana 
esDonsiDii i ty, are in the upper left hand quaarant. These are the approacnes 
vmch provide the stereotypic model on whicn the Barrett and Arcase critiaue is 
jasea. In terms of the analysis of this paper, this location is a predictor of 
ailure. The alternative model proposed at the oeginning of this section 
uggests that approaches which fall into the lower right hand quadrant provide 
he best institutional and motivational conditions for success. To achieve this 
uccess, policies, programmes and projects snouid seek to move their 
pproacnes in this direction. If we give compass bearings to our diagram the 
rescription is simple: "move south-east".
.4 Linking Conservation and Development Objectives
/ouid sucn a shift Imply the abandonment of ''conventional" conservation 
oiectives? In some ways, yes. It does imply tne abandonment of futile 
■.tempts to maintain large wildlife populations, particularly of large mammal 
:ecies, on land outside state protected areas wnich is ecologically and 
:onomicaiiy more suited to other forms of production under competitive 
arketing and tax structures. In so doing, the sh ift is asking no more of Africa 
ian w ha t has happened in North America ana Europe. (Although we should 
Dte that such land constitutes far less a proportion o f total land surface in 
frica than in Europe and North America). It also implies the surrender of the 
levelopment to promote conservation" paraaigm implicit in many programme 
id project purposes for the more holistic approach of conservation as an 
vestment for sustainable use made by African farmers.
iradoxically, however, the shift in the longer term can further conventional 
inservation objectives. Firstly, it provides an economic incentive to allocate 
propriate land to wildlife production, thus expanding its range. Conventional 
nservationist approaches in most of Sub-Saharan Africa nave failed to halt the
decline in wiidiife range, the major cause of wildlife population declines on the 
Continent. Z imoabwe, which has been pursuing the shift in a series of 
intermittent ana partial policy steps since the late 1960 's, shows an opposite 
trend.
(Figure 2)
Secondly, "going south-east" can create a better institutional context for 
"parks-peopie" relationships, that persistent concern of conventional 
conservationist approaches. This is because it creates neighbors for state 
protected areas wno have legally defined authority and responsibility, and 
mutual economic and managerial interests. Conflicts over priorities, boundary 
maintenance and cooperation in mutual interest can thus be negotiated between 
authorities o f symmetrical status in an open and structured manner. Again I use 
a Zimbabwean example. In Zimbabwe there has been iittle history o f conflict 
between national parks and their neighbors on private ranches and farms.
Among the reasons for this are that under Zimbabwean wiidiife legislation, 
proximity to parks is economically valuable to their neighbors, and that conflict 
can be resoived since neighbors can negotiate as recognized, legal proprietors. 
Conflict has m the past been endemic between parKS and their communal lana 
neighbors. The conditions mentioned above have not generally pertained. More 
recently, where tne CAMPFIRE programme has succeeded in providing 
proprietorial status for communal land farmers approximating that of commercial 
ranchers, relationships have vastly improved.
"Going south-east" can thus enhance the conditions for incentive compatibility 
between conventional conservation objectives and the interests o f African 
farmers. Accord ing to Bromley,
" In c e n tive  c o m p a tib ility  is e s ta b lish e d  w h en  io c a l in h a b ita n ts  
acqu ire  an e c o n o m ic  in te re s t in the lo n g -ru n  v ia b ility  o f  an 
e c o s y s te m  th a t is im p o rta n t to p e o p le  s itu a te d  e is e w n e re ... .  Such  
e c o s y s te m s  re p re s e n t b e n e fit  stream s fo r b o th  p a rt ie s ; those  in the 
in d u s tria lize d  N o rth  w h o  seek to p re s e rve  b io d iv e rs ity  a n d  those  
w ho m u st m ake a liv in g  am id  th is g e n e tic  re s o u r c e ." (Bromley,
1994: 429-430).
To work, however, this compatibility must start w ith  the incentives of the 
farmers w ho  decide on the destiny of wiidiife outside state protected areas, 
Putting the farmers first is, in brief, the formula for successfully linking wiidiife 
conservation and sustainable rural development in Africa.
4. A CASE STUDY IN RELATIVE AND CONDITIONAL SUCCESS: MASOKA
I now turn to a concrete example of a group of farmers w ho have "gone south­
east". One must be cautious w ith  case studies, s ince  each  represents a unique 
combination o f ecological, social and policy components. Thus this example is
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not put forward as a oolyvaient model but as a demonstration that, unaer the 
right conditions, local em powerm ent focussed on farmer neeas can enhance 
both the status of wiidlife resources and rural development oojectives. My 
example is Kanyurira Wara, a 400 sq. km. area ana its farmer population in the 
Danae Communal Lana of the Guruve D istrict.6 "Kanyurira W ard” is the 
government administrative designation for this sub-unit of the Guruve Rural 
District Council, which has 24 such wards, each w ith  designated and mapped 
boundaries. Kanyurira is the name of the sub-chief, but the area is locally and 
commonly called MasoKa, from the name of spirit medium Nemasoka, who 
represents the ancestral spirit "ow ners" of the land. In local perspectives, these 
!and spirits have a much larger territory than the ward boundaries o f the Council 
map, and includes parts of the neighboring Doma and Chewore Safari Areas 
under state co n tro l.7
The people of Masoka are residentially clustered along a six kilometre stretch of 
the Angwa River w hich  flows through the ward. In 1988 t re  settlement was 
made up of 60 housenolds, w ith  a totai population of 482  people.8 Household 
subsistence came from dry-land cultivation of grains, w inter cultivation of 
riverain lands for maize and vegetables, and some remittances from the export 
of male labour. There was one cash crop, cotton, grown oy 73%  of 
households. For most households net revenue from this source was small since 
the remote location posed formidable transport and marketing problems. Owing 
to the presence of tsetse fly, no cattle and only a few  goats were present.
Some of the population's protein requirements came from  poultry, and a larger 
proportion from game meat, legally "poached" and yielding about 40 kg. per 
person per annum .9 The benefits of this harvest were, however, balanced in 
farmers minds against its costs. Nearly every household experienced regular 
crop raiding by wiidlife, the principal species involved being elephant, buffalo, 
wildpig and baboons/monkeys. These costs extenaed to personal jeoparay. 
Fourteen households (23.3% ) reported incidents of injury or death due to
3 Brief descriptions of Kanvurira's experience in the CAMPFIRE Programme also 
appear in Murpnree (1983: 9-10) and Metcalfe (1994: 179-181). A book-length 
monograph on Kanyurira is in preparation.
7 This is a highly compressed statement on the ecopolitical ana ecoreligious 
dimensions of land ana resources in Masoka which are nighly relevant but cannot be 
addressed here.
3 The Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe has been 
conducting research in Masoxa for over 10 years. 1988 statistics are from Cutshall 
(1989).
3 This estimate is based on Murindagomo's study of the neighboring ward, 
Chisunga, which exhibits similar conditions (Murindagomo, 1 988: 82). Clearly the 
people of Chisunga and Masoka needed no ICDP project to give them a "taste for 
meat".
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wildlife in the previous three years, three of these being deatns (Cutshali 1 989: ■ 
28-31).
Modern infrastructural services were almost completely absent. Prior to 1988 
there was no school, and the few  children whose parents wanted them to have 
schooling had to walk 30 km. through the bush to the nearest primary school at 
Angwa Bridge on Sundays, sleeDing in grass shelters and cooking for 
themselves during the week and returning home on Fridays. No clinic existed, 
and the sick had to make the same journey to the clinic at Angwa Bridge.
Since Masoka was a wildlife rich area there was a hunting safari camp in the 
ward. The professional hunter, operating under a concession issued by the 
Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) in Harare, 
would occasionally provide transport for the seriously ill. He also provided w ork 
for 5 males in the settlement.
In retrospect, we can see how  1988 was a pivotal year in determining the 
directions w hich  the farmers of Masoka would take w ith  their wildlife. Three 
events were of particular significance. The first was the erection of a tw o- 
roomed school in January 1988 by the District Council, using wiidlife revenues 
made available to it by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management through Project WINDFALL icf. Whose Eden?, p. 79). Researchers 
from the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe 
(CASS) and the W W F Multispecies Animal Production Systems Project in Harare 
(WWF) had been suggesting to the people of Masoxa previously that their 
wildlife had far higher values than their local off-takes represented. The 
erection of the school had a significant impact on the farmers' v iew  of this 
message. "We see  n o w  th a t y o u  are r ig h t , " they said, "these  b u ffa lo  are w orth  
m on e y to us. "
But ambivalence remained, spurred by the second major event of 1988. This 
was the clearance of tsetse fly by aeriai spraying unaer the EEC's Zambezi 
Valley tsetse control programme tcf. Derman, 1990; Derman ana Muromoeazi, 
1994). This opened the w ay for tne introduction of cattle ana the 
encouragement of new settlement by immigrants, w ho were already flooding 
into eastern wards of Danae. People were not blina to the fact that cattle and 
immigrants would over time diminish their wildlife resources, but on balance 
were in favour o f encouraging immigrants to settle in the ward. Three reasons 
were put fo rward. Immigrants would be allocated lands on the periphery of the 
settlement and thus take the brunt of croD damage by wildlife. Secondly, there 
was plenty of land. Thirdly, more people would mean a better case for Masoka 
when it appealed to the Council for school, clinic, transport and other facilities 
(Cutshali, 1989: 21-23). This last reason is revealing; the farmers of Masoka 
were still strategizing in the extractive aeoendency mode created by colonialism
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and still characteristic of centre-periphery relationships in much of rural Sub- 
Saharan A fr ica .10
The tnirri event was a Government decision in October 1988, followea by a 
series of debates leading to a wildlife revenue distribution in Masoka in March 
1989. In October 1988, the Minister of Environment and Tourism proclaimed 
the Guruve D istrict Council an "Appropriate A u tho r ity "  for wildlife in the area 
under tne CAMPFIRE Programme, giving Council the same legal authority over 
and responsibility for wildlife as that held by commercial farmers and rancners 
(cf, Whose Eden? : 92-95). This meant that all 1988 revenues from safari 
hunting in Guruve Council lands w ent directly to Council.
In the Council debates w hich  ensued tw o  issues were paramount. Firstly, 
should Council appropriate all these revenues and use them in all wards? The 
ward councillors from  wards w ith  no wiidlife were not surprisingly in favour of 
this approach, arguing for "equ ity ."  Fortunately for Masoka the Council, w ith  
the insigntful leadership o f a Council Chairman, District Executive Officer and 
District Administrator, adopted the principle that "d iffe re n tia l in p u ts  m u st re s u it  
in a iffe re n tia i b e n e fits . " (Murpnree, 1993: 6i. The decision was taken tna t 
wildlife revenues, less Council levies ana administrative costs, snould be 
returned to wards  \n proportion to  tbe safari ’nuutrnp taVte-otfs funder oistnct- 
w ide puotasi w'nicb bad been provided py these wards. As a result, Masoka 
received the "lion 's  share" of 1988 hunting revenues distributed to the wards, 
Z$47,000.
The second issue was w ha t Masoka snouid do w ith  this Z$47 ,000 , ano who 
should make the decision. Again, there was an element in these debates which 
argued that Council should make the decision and that the money shouid be 
used for com m unity  infrastructure. There were paternalistic and instrumental 
components to this argument. The people of Masoka were really too 
unsopnisticated to make decisions on such a large amount of money, tney 
would squander it on beer and self-inauigence. And, if Council made f~e 
allocation and built, for instance, anotr.er tw o  classrooms for tne scnooi it 
would be seen, by Government and the Deople, as fulfilling its development 
responsibilities. Fortunately again for Masoka, and w ith  the enlightened 
guidance of the leadership mentioned eariier, Council resolved to give the entire 
Z$47 ,000  to Masoka and let its people aecide w hat to do w ith  it. Their 
decision was to declare a wildlife dividend of Z$200 to each household (now 
numbering 64) and use the balance to improve their school.
At a ceremony in Masoka in March, 1989, representatives of each household 
stepped forward and received $200 in cash. The impact was profound. For all 
households, but particularly for the poorer ones including those headea by
: Up to this point, the Masoka story in some respects conforms to the 
Barrett.'Arcase paradigm. WINDFALL was very much like their ICDPs: farmer 
stratagems somewhat as those they attribute to "locals."
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widows, the amount involved was substantial, eauivaient to an additional 56% 
on average gross income from cotton. More suojectiveiy, but no less 
importantly, perceptions of their wildlife resource were changing. "W e see  
n o w , "  said the Chief, "th a t these  b u ffa lo  are o u r ca ttle . W e are g o in g  to farm  
th e m ." The resource was valuable and it was theirs to use sustainably.
If the buffalo tana other wildlife) were theirs, how  snouid the resource be 
managed? CASS and WWF researchers suggested to the Masoka farmers that 
They needed to do some land use planning, only to oe told that they already haa 
a plan "in the ir h e a d s ." Their plan allocated an 18 km: area around the 
settlement for residential and cropping purposes to oe surrounded by an electric 
fence to keep out buffalo and elephant. The plan was submitted to the Council 
for approval, assertively. Their councillor was charged w ith  presenting the 
proposal to Council w ith  the fo llowing words : Te ll them  th a t these are o u r  
anim als a n d  these  are o u r  p la n s . W e w ill n o t a c c e n t a n y  c h a n g e s  im p o se d  b y  
o th e r s ."
The pian was approved and the fende built during 1 989, w ith  funds accessed 
by W W F .11 * The one technological intervention in tne MasoKa case study , the 
impact of the fence was significant in a number of dimensions. Firstly, it 
worked in its explicit objective. Crop raiding w ith in tne fence nas become 
in s ig n i f i c a n t . N o  deaths, and only tw o  injuries, cue to wiidlife have occurred 
since its erection. Institutionally, the fence accelerated organizational 
development for collective resource management since the fence had to be 
monitored and maintained, which Masoka's wildlife com m ittee does by 
employing (from wildlife revenues) four uniformed fence minders. Finally, its 
subjective and attitudinal impact has been profound. Wildlife, for the farmers of 
Masoka, is no longer an uncontrollable and amorpnous asset. It is an asset 
which can be controlled and managed for sustainaoie benefit. It has, in effect, 
been semi-domesticated and taken on some of the cnaracteristics of 
livestock.13 Sometime after the erection of the fence I asxed the Masoka 
farmers if the fence was working. "M a rv e lo u s ly ," was the reply. "O n ly  w e  
h a ve  som e b u ffa lo  inside  the fence  a t the m om e n t w h ic h  w e re  d rive n  in b y  
H o n s ." "H o w  m a n y ? "  I asked. "S ix : tw o  bulls , tw o  c o w s  a n d  tw o  ca lve s . B ut 
no p ro b le m , w e  w ill d ro p  a se c tio n  o f  the fence  a n a  d rive  them  out. " They
"  The fence cost Z$70,000, labour being provided cv Masoxa farmers. This 
$70,000 and funding for initial 2 year maintenance has ceen the oniy direct external 
project input into Masoka's programme.
' 2 Some cropping of riverain alluvium takes place outside the fence, in areas 
impossible to include within the fence because of seasonal flooding . Masoka's view is 
that farmers using these areas do so at their own risk, ana without any collective 
liability being accepted.
13 Arguably, the best way of ensuring the survival of a species. Bos taurus appears 
on no one's "red book." The "domestication" of the ostrich (Strutnio cameius) and the 
Nile crocodile (Crocodilus mloticus) are more recent examples.
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were, in fact, living ud to their resolve. They were farming tneir ouf fa io and, 
like any good farmer w ith  his livestock, they were beginning to see buffalo in 
terms of number, sex and age. And also like good farmers,  they are today 
looking after the habitat of their wildlife " livestock". Today, Masoka's 400  km ' 
are under a fire control regime. A wildlife water point development pian has 
been initiated. There are no snares, species numbers have increased and 
Masoxa is entering the live-sale market w ith  the saie of roan antelope.
The development of locai collective management o f wiidlife oroauction is, 
however, only half of the picture. Equally important is people management: 
the management of internal conflic t and deviance; the management of external 
relations; the management of market conditions; and fiscal management and 
revenue allocations. In each of these aspects, the Masoxa case study provides 
a wealth of data which  cannot be fully analyzed here, but I will com m ent on 
certain aspects of Masoxa's management regime germame to this paper:
a) Locus of decision making. In Masoka the focai point for most, althougn 
not all, of this management is the Wildlife Committee, wnich in practice is 
merged w ith  the Ward Development Committee, Government s officially 
designated unit for locai development planning. Typicaiiy in Zimbabwe 
these Ward Development Committees are weak, since they have no fiscal 
resources o f their own and act primarily as conduits to articulate ward 
aspirations ana requests to district councils. Masoxa's relative and 
conditional proprietorship o f resources and revenues has meant that its 
Wildlife Committee has significant finance and powers. Membership on 
the Committee is thus important and the subject of intra-ward political 
manoeuvering, drawing on "traditional" and "m oaern ” elective 
legitimations. Memoership has changed considerably over time, the 
composition of the Committee reflecting an organic evolution in response 
to the demands for administrative and negotiatory skills while maintaining 
its responsiveness to local consensus. That tne Committee is 
representative is in little doubt. The latest survey on this issue shows 
that 81 %  of the households were satisfied w ith  the cecisions of 
Com m ittee.’ * Equally important is that the decisions of the Committee 
are primarily responsive to its own local constituency. The Committee 
has had "light to u c h ” facilitative guidance from the District Council ana 
NGO agencies, but decisions remain firmly under its control.
b) Poaching, Masoka has developed bye-laws which regulate all use of the 
commonage and which apply not only to terrestrial wiidlife out to fish and 
woodland resources as well. They have never read O strom 's "design 
principles" (Whose Eden?, p. 49) but they have "graduated sanctions” 
which are progressively applied. One household has Deen expelled after 
having been found guilty of setting veld fires three times. But the most
’4 The specific question yielding this statistic was whether the decisions of the 
Wildlife Committee were in the interests of both men and women. (Nabane, 1996: 85)
effective instrument bringing compliance is the peer pressure of a tightly 
knit, social grouping. Poacning is no longer seen as individual and 
entrepreneurial defiance of state regulations; it is now  theft from the 
community and one's neighbors since it reduces the size of household 
dividends.
c) Immigration, After the 1989 dividend ceremony attitudes towards 
immigration began to shift rapidly. Wildlife was valuable, and the more 
habitat it had available the greater its numbers and value would be. Wild 
land thus became more valuable, it had to be used parsimoniously and 
made available only for the "children" of MasoKa. With Masoka's 
economic success, many of these "children" returned and by 1995 there 
were 123 households on the dividend list. This listing, this membership 
in the communal regime, is a valuable economic asset. It is conferrea 
carefully, since the farmers of MasoKa can do their arithmetic ana know 
that the size of the denominator will influence the size of a household 
dividend in any given year. Barrett and Arcase's fear of encouraging 
immigration through success is, in this case, misplacea since tneir 
paradigm ieaves no place for the organized collective interest that 
Masoxa's communal regime supplies.
d) Managing market reiations. The farmers of Masoka have enthusiastically 
entered the market for wildlife resources. Their "taste" for subsistence 
usage of these resources has been, in their calculations, displaced by the 
realization that the safari market provides components which maxe the 
value of an impala sold to the operator far higher than its meat value. In 
1990 the District Council, in an effort to "sell" the CAMPFIRE Programme 
th roughout Dande, instituted a cropping programme to provide wards 
w ith  a limited amount of fresh meat. When the cropping team came to 
Masoka it was told to leave. Farmers there would prefer to have the 
safari price of an impala which wouid buy ten goats, the team was 
informed.
Masoka still does not have control of the hunting concession lease, wnich 
under current legislation is still in the hands of the Council. This places 
them, in terms of the authority and responsibility variaDle, somewnat 
"north" of the CAMPFIRE principle as shown in Figure 1.6. But they are 
on a sharp iearning curve regarding the details of their m arket,:5 and 
exercise their authority to the extent permitted. They employ out of their 
wildlife revenues four game scouts who monitor all safari hunts. The
- Two years ago, in a wildlife committee meeting at Masoka. I was asked for the 
current exchange rate between the Zimbabwean and US dollars. When asked why they 
wished to know, the reply was that they knew that the ooerator's contract had been 
signed the year before in Zimbabwe dollars. "3ut," they said, "we know  that the 
operator receives m oney from his clients in US$ and that these n ow  buy more 
Zimbabwe dollars. Where has the extra m oney gone?"
records of the operator and District Council are carefully checked against 
their own. A healthy realization has developed among both the farmers 
and the operator that success for both depends on mutual cooperation.
ei Allocation o f wildlife revenues. Wildlife revenue allocations by the 
farmers of Masoka for the years 1990-1994  are indicated in Table 1 
below. The Table aggregates the 10-15 line items o f Masoka's buaget 
prepared annually into the three categories o f resource management, 
housenoid dividends/food relief and com m unity  projects. The "household 
diviaends/food relief" category includes direct cash payments to 
households, and in some years funds used collectively to purchase gram 
for distribution to households.















1990 78 170 10 260 25 200 42 710 |
(13%) (32%) (55%) I
1991 89 293 7 798 69 677 11818  !
(8%) (78%) (13%) !
1 992 276 745 44 279 10 640 221 826
(16%) (4%) (80%) I
1993 459 891 65 599 1 27 000 267 292
I (14%) (28%) : 5 9 % ;
l 1994 639 290 138 290 1 65 000 3 3 6 C C 0
I (22%) (26%) (52%)
The fo llow ing points can be drawn from these statistics:
* The value of their o ff-farm wildlife resource is significant, ana 
escalating annually as market values spiral and their resource 
management improves. By entering an export-orientated ana 
foreign exchange generating market, these farmers are capitalizing 
on the comparative international advantages that their large 
mammal populations provide.
* This exploitation o f an "o ff- fa rm " natural resource is highly 
significant for the household economies involved. Per housenoid
casn revenues from  wildlife are now  more than double the average- 
household income from their other casn crop, cotton.
* The farmers of Masoka are reinvesting a significant proportion of 
tneir wildlife revenues in the management of the revenue.
* Contra the arguments of Barrett and Arcase, by entering the 
wildlife market these farmers are reducing their vulnerability to the 
vagaries of drought and growing conditions. Note that 1991 
revenues were allocated at nearly 80%  for household dividends 
ano drought relief, owing to an almost complete crop failure in the 
1990-1991 growing season. By contrast, 1993 and 1994 
revenues were used primarily for the development of local 
infrastructure. In other words, they are shrewdly using their 
w ildlife revenues flexibly, in good crop years for collective 
ceveiopment, in years of crop failure as food security. Their 
preference, when conditions permit, is to tilt revenue allocations 
tow ards collective infrastructure ano today Masoka has a six- 
roomed school and a new Z$350,000  clinic, ail planned ano paid 
for Dy themselves. Not one penny of government or donor aid has 
gone into these buildings, and Masoka's sense of self­
accomplishment is perhaps as important an ou tpu t as the services 
these buildings provide. They are, in effect, lifting tnemseives out 
of the "extractive dependency" syndrome mentioned earlier. This 
is an essential element in any programme aimed at sustainability.
The Masoka case study is, as the title of this section suggests, one of relative 
and conditional success in linking sustainable wildlife use and rural development 
through local em powerm ent. Relative, since Masorca's em powerm ent has not 
yet reached tne stage of legally backed proprietorship. Conditional, in that 
Masoka's em powerm ent remains dependent on the Guruve Council's continued 
devolution of be f acto authority and responsibility to the ward. But, relative ano 
conditional as it may be, Masoka's success shows that it is possioie to link 
conservation w ith  sustainable development througn regimes of communal 
resource use and management under the right conditions. These conditions 
may not be found everywhere, but they can certainiy be found, or created, in a 
far larger range of contexts than government ano donor policy establishments 
appear to be aware. 5
5. MATCHING ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL TOPOGRAPHY
Up to this point I have managed to w rite  a paper on "Approaches to com m unity 
participation" w ith ou t attempting to define "com m unity ."  This has been 
deliberate. Anthropological and sociological literature is replete w itn  attempts to
do so .16 but the term remains loose and its definitions so m ultiform as to 
render the word anaiyticaiiy meaningless as a general concent. W hat this 
analysis has done, in effect, is to discard the term and suggest that w ha t we 
are really looking for are units of social topography providing the conditions for 
collective or "com m unal" regimes o f managing common property. The second 
characteristic of the modei put forwara in Section 3 makes tnis dear: we are 
looking at "farmer motivation, rights and organization under conditions reauiring 
collective management of wiidlife resources in defined com monages."
The viable profile for such units is far dearer in scholarship than our various 
definitions of com m unity. Some of its characteristics have been mentioned on 
page nine. But, in addition to these, we need to note certain underlying 
assumptions that tney involve regarding social topograpny. One is that there 
must be clearly defined autnority  and responsibility boundary definitions over 
land and resources. Anotner is that cooperation and compliance w ith in the unit 
depend primarily on peer Dressure, implying in turn a tightly knit interactive 
social unit spatially located to permit th is .17
When we a ttem pt to apply this profile to the use and management of free- 
ranging large mammal populations we may encounter social, ecological or 
market conditions which make the application difficult. Firstly, 
demand/resource considerations require that a relatively smail human population 
constituting the proprietorial unit commands a relatively large wildlife range to 
provide the economic incentives discussed. In other words, low human 
population densities are likely to be a predictor of economic success. This is 
shown clearly in Bond's analysis of the relationship between population density 
and ward revenues in the CAMPFIRE Programme (cf. Figure 3). Concomitantly, 
low population densities may result in a spatial dispersion o f human settlement, 
militating against the t ightly  knit interactive social unit tha t the institutions of 
collective proprietorsnip reauire. In Masoka this is not the case, but does apply 
m other contexts.
Secondly, the exDioitation of wiidlife resources in sucn high-value modes as 
safari hunting reauires iarge concession units which may not correspond w ith  
tne social scale requirements for effective localized collective management.
Even in the Masoka case their revenues derive from a hunting concession which 
includes other wards.
Turner, in an analysis of four proto-conservancies being developed in Namibia's 
Conservancy Programme, makes observations which highlight this " lack of f i t"  
between social and ecological topography. In tw o  of his case studies "it is  d e a r  
tha t the u n it o f  'p ro p r ie to rs h ip ' ■ a ii the  p e o p le  u n d e r  re s p e c t iv e  tra d itio n a l 
a u th o ritie s  - w o u ld  n o t c o rre s p o n d  w ith  the m u ch  sm a lle r s o c ia l a n d  sp a tia l
5 In the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE context see Hasler, 1393. 
"7 cf. Murphree, 1 993: 7.
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rfg o f production, m a n a ge m en t a n d  b e n e f it ." In the other tw o, "the o ve riap  
ween the p ro p rie ta ry  o r s o c ia l in te re s t u n it a n d  the p ro d u c tio n  and  
Management un it is  easie r to id e n tify , b u t  o n ly  on a m u ch  la rg e r g e o g ra p h ic a l 
fsca ie ."(Turner, 1996: 32).
For many contexts this mismatch between social and ecological topography 
poses a major implementationai problem for the model which this paper 
advocates. As Turner comments, "it is  from  th is im p e rfe c t fit o f  p la c e s  a n d  
people that m o st o f  the o p e ra tio n a l d iffic u lt ie s  o f  the c o n s e rv a n c y  c o n c e p t w ill 
arise." (Turner, 1996: iv). That it exists in such contexts is not, however, a 
negation of the model. It is rather a challenge to research and planning to 
accommodate these factors in specific, on-the-ground social and ecological 
realities. In many cases the solution is likely to be found in "nested" systems of 
enterprise involving co-management w ith  other stakeholders, including other 
proprietorial units and coalescive traditional and government structures, (cf. 
Ostrom, 1990: 90). If these coalescive structures avoid claims o f proprietorship 
and perform their proper facilitative and coordinative roles, such systems can 
work. Devoivement of authority and responsibility does not imply the 
withdrawal of government invoivement or iocalizea autarky. W hat it coes imply 
is the conferment of strong and enduring rights to units best piacea to exercise 
them and a government com m itm ent to provide the enabling policy ana 
coordinative environment required for these rights to be translated into 
sustainable and productive systems of wildlife use.
6. CONCLUSION
In summary, I return to where I started, w ith  the "cocktail critique" of 
community participation approaches (p.2). Using the analysis of this paper, let 
us re-examine the concerns and reservations expressed.
6.1 "These approaches show mixed or inconclusive results."
Yes, they do. In part this is for aefinitional reasons. Our use of the terms 
"com m unity" and "partic ipa tion” are so loose and amorphous that the concept 
is applied to a wide range of approaches, the results of which are inevitably 
mixed. More fundamentally, however, the problem lies in the fact that most of 
these approaches are conventionally conservationist in objective and cooptive 
rather than empowering in their allocation of authority and responsibility.
W ithout claiming that it addresses all contexts of biodiversity concern or 
"com m unity  partic ipation" possibilities, this analysis suggests that the most 
viable way of achieving " ro b u s t c o s t e ffe c tive  a n d  e ffic ie n t, n o n -s u b s id iz e d  
s y s te m s  a n d  in s t itu t io n s ” linking wildlife w ith  sustainable development in most 
of Sub-Saharan Africa is through the devolution of authority and responsibility 
over wildlife to localized proprietorial regimes. In this model, "com m unity" 
becomes a communal property regime w ith  state and social legitimation for 
strong access and control rights. "Participation" becomes the collective
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organization of member farmers' incentives for current use and investment in 
future benefit. Barrett and Arcese's formulation of ICDPs as having "the o a s ic  
notion  o f  an e x c h a n g e  o f  a c c e ss  fo r  m ateria l c o n s id e ra tio n "  is radically revised 
in this model, w m ch has the basic notion of conferment of access to stimulate 
sustainaole production.
6.2 "These approaches require long time frames.”
Again, they do. In the case of many of the cooptive, conservationist 
approacnes for wnich we have examples, this lies in their failure to decisively 
resolve the issues of authority, responsibility and farmer motivation. The 
alternative approach put forward here also requires a long time frame, not 
because farmers are s low to responsibly respond to authority  status, but 
because the model requires a tenurial revolution w hich  faces the obstacles of 
political, legal ano bureaucratic inertia. To remove this inertia sound research 
strategically articulated to impact on central government political and planning 
processes is required. This research must have national legitimacy and be 
reinforced by potent, organised constituency cemana from farmers themselves 
(Muronree, 1995 b ). Such a process is necessariiv protracted and caiis for 
"uncommon flexibility, sensitivity anc long term com m itm ent by externai 
agencies.” (Turner, 1996: 40).
6.3 "They are expensive."
Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that the political, legal and bureaucratic 
obstacles mentioned above require extended research and advocacy to convince 
policy makers that they need to be changed, and protracted facilitation to adapt 
devolution to the on-the-ground social and ecological topographies discussed in 
Section 5. No, in that direct fiscal inputs to local development can be iow, as 
the Masoka case study shows. No, in that if a critical mass of successful locai 
empowerment examples is achieved replication can De lateral, farmers 
themselves acting as the main extension agents.
6.4 "They involve risk to the wildlife resource base."
Of course they do. Any devolution of authority and responsibility involves a 
gamole on the competence and integrity of those wno receive it. But any 
consideration o f risk must consider alternatives. W hat are the alternatives? 
Africa cannot afford to expand its protected areas system at necessary levels of 
efficient management and political acceptability. For w ild life outside protected 
areas, the status quo  w i l l  not w ork. Putative state proprietorship is impotent in 
the face of farmer land allocations where wildlife is valueless to them and 
wildlife ranges are shrinking. Furthermore, the status quo effectively removes 
wildlife from the repertoire of resources available for rural development. Barrett 
and Arcase's injunction to "decouple human needs from the harvest of large 
mammais" is, in fact, a prescription diminishing capacities to meet the first and 
a formula to accelerate unsustainable harvests of the second.
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! alternatives t h u s  involve greater risks than devolution. Indeed they bear 
Inore the character o f negative certainty than risk. In a recently published book, 
Graham Child reacnes the same conclusion. His theme is the same as mine, 
and he states it better than I can:
"... i f  w iid/ife is  p e rm itte d  to c o n trib u te  m e a n in g fu lly  to the ir  
w elfare , p e o p le  w ill n o t  be  able  to a ffo rd  to lose  It in th e ir ba ttle  fo r  
s u rv iva l. I f  w iid iife  d o e s  n o t  c o n tr ib u te  s ig n if ic a n tly  to the ir w e ll­
b e in g , p e o p le  w ill n o t  be  able  to a ffo rd  to p re s e rv e  it, e x c e p t as a 
to u ris t c u r io s ity  in a fe w  p ro te c te d  areas. ” 1 Child, 1 995: 235).
The scenario of wiidiife as a tourist attraction in a few  protected areas may 
satisfy some conventional conservationists. But in this Consultation we are 
focussed on w iid iife  as a resource for sustainable aeveiopment. For this 
objective, in many areas of rural Sub-Saharan Africa, there is no viable 
alternative to systems which devolve the authority ana responsibility to use 
wiidiife sustainably to communal regimes w ith  strong proprietary rights. For 
those interested in a development objective, this is me central message o f this 
analysis. For tnose w ith  a conservation objective, me message is that the 
relinquishment rather than the retention of spurious control is the means to 
attain it.
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